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This paper evaluates the usefulness of the resource-based view (RBV) to the ﬁeld of operations man-
agement. Based on the seminal RBV articles, we argue that using the RBV does not align with the ob-
jectives and activities of operations management researchers in several ways. First, the dependent
variable in the RBV is sustained competitive advantage. Using sustained competitive advantage as a
dependent variable implies that scholars focus on explaining the differences between the relatively few
ﬁrms with sustained competitive advantage and all the other ﬁrms, ignoring performance variations
within the great mass of ﬁrms. In addition, competitive advantage exists at the level of the business or
the ﬁrm and does not directly translate into the normal level of operations management research.
Measuring sustained competitive advantage also presents difﬁculties. Second, the explanatory variables
in the RBV are resources that must be rare, valuable and hard or impossible to imitate. Measuring
valuable resources or factors ﬁrms cannot imitate poses serious problems both in demonstrating value
independent of the factor's impact on performance (i.e., avoiding tautology) and in measuring unique or
nearly unique entities. Third, under the RBV, prescription is problematic; you cannot prescribe things
that ﬁrms can readily implement because such things can be imitated. We present the practice-based
view (PBV) as a simpler and better alternative for operations management where scholars attempt to
explain the entire range of ﬁrm and unit performance based on transferable practices.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In their very impressive discussion of the resource based view,
Hitt et al. (2015) present what they see as the key characteristics of
the resource based theory and evaluate its implications for opera-
tions management scholarship. Speciﬁcally, they discuss how
research in four key areas of operations management e supply
chain management, operations strategy, performance manage-
ment, and product/service innovation e aligns with resource based
theory.
Let us begin by noting that strategy scholars generally call what
Hitt et al. (2015) termed the Resource Based Theory as the Resource
Based View (RBV). We will use the RBV terminology for two rea-
sons. First, it is the standard terminology. Second, we see the RBV
more as an umbrella concept than a theory per se. We explain this
below.
Any discussion of the RBV inherently depends on how one de-
ﬁnes the RBV. We wish to disagree with Hitt et al. (2015)characterizations of the RBV and to offer a somewhat different
analysis that leads to different conclusions about the RBV's value to
the ﬁeld of operations management. Since we are not in the oper-
ations management ﬁeld, let us clarify what we see as the primary
interests of the ﬁeld. We believe operations management scholars
want to explain which ﬁrms use which operations management
practices and understand the inﬂuence of such operations man-
agement practices on operational performance. A good under-
standing of such relations could support prescription.
The RBV has been incredibly popular in strategy and operations
management research for several reasons. It has an extremely
compelling logic but, aswewill argue in this paper, the logic rests on
factually incorrect assumptions. It also has been applied by scholars
who for the most part do not take the details of the RBV arguments
seriously, a point acknowledged by Barney (2001). As we will
demonstrate later, the immensemajorityof strategypapers claiming
to use the RBV do not do so in a way that could ever test the RBV.
We will criticize the suitability of the RBV for operations man-
agement research on several grounds. First, seminal articles on the
RBV identiﬁed the dependent variable in the RBV as sustained
competitive advantage. Using sustained competitive advantage as a
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differences between the relatively few ﬁrms with sustained
competitive advantage and all the other ﬁrms, ignoring perfor-
mance variations within the great mass of ﬁrms. In addition,
competitive advantage exists at the level of the business or ﬁrm and
does not directly translate into the normal level of operations
management research. Measuring sustained competitive advan-
tage presents such difﬁculties that the immense majority of RBV
studies in strategy do not even try to measure it, using ﬁrm per-
formance instead. Second, the explanatory variables in the RBV are
resources that must be rare, valuable and hard or impossible to
imitate. Measuring valuable resources or factors ﬁrms cannot
imitate poses serious problems both in demonstrating value inde-
pendent of the factor's impact on performance (i.e., avoiding tau-
tology) and in measuring unique or nearly unique entities. Third,
under the RBV, prescription is problematic; you cannot prescribe
things that ﬁrms can readily implement because such things can be
imitated and so are not RBV resources. We present the practice-
based view (PBV) as a simpler and better alternative for opera-
tions management where scholars attempt to explain the entire
range of ﬁrm and unit performance based on transferable practices.
In the next section, we identify the core ideas, constructs, and
intellectual foundations of the RBV. We detail why we see the RBV
as inappropriate for operations management research, and why we
see the RBV as a perspective rather than a theory. The following
sections expand on these issues considering problems in the use-
fulness of the RBV for operations management based on two major
components of the RBV namely, the dependent variable of interest
and the kinds of variables that explain the dependent variable. We
then present the practice-based view (PBV, Bromiley and Rau,
2014) as an alternative to the RBV. We conclude the paper by
exploring the implications of the practice based view for operations
management research.
2. What is the RBV?
Deﬁning the RBV runs into the difﬁculty that authors have
written about it in somewhat inconsistent ways. Hence, clarity
about the RBV is problematic. We, and we think most strategy
scholars, view the seminal RBV works as Barney (1986, 1991) and
Peteraf (1993). Most RBV studies cite these three articles as the
basis of the RBV, giving these studies extremely high numbers of
citations. Consequently, we take these three articles as deﬁning the
RBV. When we refer to the RBV in this paper, we mean the RBV as
presented in these papers.
In brief, the RBV attempts to explain ﬁrm sustainable
competitive advantage as stemming from ﬁrm resources that
are rare, valuable, hard or impossible to imitate or duplicate,
and hard to substitute. This description alone suggests the RBV is
not appropriate for most of what operations management scholars
want to study. Operations management practices for the most part
are not RBV resources. Most practices are not rare or impossible to
imitate. Indeed, operations management scholars generally want to
identify practices that many ﬁrms can implement. Furthermore,
operations activities per se do not tie to sustained competitive
advantage. Operations management activities have performance
implications, but good operations management is neither neces-
sary nor sufﬁcient for sustained competitive advantage. Conse-
quently, this paper will elaborate on these two themes: the
problems with both the dependent variable and the explanatory
variables in the operations management context.
We see the RBV as a perspective rather than a theory primarily
because a theory should lead to testable hypotheses; a theory
should be refutable or falsiﬁable (Bacharach, 1989). However, the
RBV does not lead to many testable hypotheses, particularly in theform proposed by Hitt et al. (2015). Exactly what data and analysis
would refute the RBV as described by Hitt et al. (2015)? One might
argue the RBV predicts that ﬁrms will differ and that those differ-
ences will improve performance. However, any sensible theory of
organizations predicts ﬁrms differ and those differences will in-
ﬂuence performance, but obviously ﬁrm differences can have
negative or positive inﬂuences on performance. One might argue
the RBV predicts serial correlation in performance, but again any
sensible theory of organizations predicts this. Even a conventional
economic model where ﬁrms make optimal decisions can make
these predictions if we assume random shocks at the ﬁrm level and
adjustment costs.
The theoretical developments of the RBV domake some testable
assertions, but these are not assertions RBV scholars usually
consider. Speciﬁcally, theoretical developments of the RBV imply
that ﬁrms cannot obtain sustainable competitive advantage by the
use of practices that are not RBV resources. Theoretical de-
velopments of the RBV also imply that ﬁrms will use all publicly
available practices that might beneﬁt the ﬁrms making these un-
able to explain sustained competitive advantage. However, RBV
scholars do not concern themselves with these implications.
We do agree that the mechanisms identiﬁed by the RBV can
operate, but, contrary to RBV theorizing, they are not the sole
explanation for variation in ﬁrm performancewithin industries and
may not even be the primary ones. The logic in RBV papers suggests
that only RBV resources matter in explaining sustained competitive
advantage, but we will argue that ﬁrm abilities that are not
necessarily rare, imitable, or inherently valuable can also explain
performance variation.
A more serious issue is that the RBV's lack of speciﬁcity means
that most studies ostensibly under the RBV label actually use other
theories to justify their hypotheses. Suppose for example that the
resource of interest was a combination of human resources (HR)
practices that resulted in greater employee motivation and per-
formance. Remember, these practices must not be deﬁnable
enough that they can be readily copied or imitated. The RBV says
nothing about the relation between the HR practices and employee
motivation and between employee motivation and ﬁrm perfor-
mance. Rather, the arguments linking HR to motivation and moti-
vation to performance derive from theories of employeemotivation
(see, for example, De Saa Perez and Falcon, 2004). RBV scholarship
generally follows this pattern e invoking the RBV but actually
justifying hypotheses with other, non-RBV, theories. According to
Hitt et al. (2015), this trend appears also in operations management
research based on the RBV; Hitt et al. (2015) notes that 77% of the
articles in this ﬁeld that used RBV did so in conjunction with other
theories such as transactions cost theory, agency theory, etc.
It may help to understand the RBV by examining its implicit and,
and to some extent explicit, intellectual foundations. RBV theo-
rizing often takes as a backdrop a world where every ﬁrm can and
does imitate every useful technique. In such a world, the theorists
assume ﬁrms will tend toward homogeneity and equal proﬁtability.
Indeed, following such a logic, Grant and Jordan (2012, 174e175)
says “(i)n the long run, competition eliminates differences in
proﬁtability between competing ﬁrms … In the world tobacco in-
dustry, the external environment is fairly stable and the leading
ﬁrms pursue similar strategies … competitive advantages, as re-
ﬂected in inter-ﬁrm proﬁt differentials, tend to be small.”While this
sounds plausible, it is dead wrong. If we look at the seven cigarette
manufacturers available in Compustat (sic code 2111), in 2012, re-
turn on assets varied from 2.5% to 23.3% and return on equity is
much more variable. A quick examination of the distribution of
performance by industry will show that almost all industries have
substantial continuing variation in performance. Such variation is
not just between a set of high performing ﬁrms and the mass of
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distribution.
Due to this implicit assumption that ﬁrms will tend toward
homogeneity and equal proﬁtability, RBV scholars view explaining
ﬁrm heterogeneity or why ﬁrms differ as a central issue. Lippman
and Rumelt (1982) tried to explain why ﬁrms may differ in per-
formance in a market in equilibrium. Their explanation rested on
ﬁrms drawing production functions from a distribution. Barney
(1986) and others attempt to address a similar problem in that
they assume a generally available pool of knowledge that all ﬁrms
use appropriately. The RBV assumes that everyone knows all
practices in the public domain, and if everyone could implement a
practice, all ﬁrms that will beneﬁt from the practice will use it,
eliminating its ability to explain variation in performance. Given
these assumptions, ﬁrms that consistently have higher perfor-
mance must have rare, valuable, hard to imitate or duplicate, and
hard to substitute resources.
Our disagreement with Hitt et al. (2015) on the usefulness of
RBV for operations management rests on twomajor components of
the resource-based view. First, what dependent variable does the
RBV attempt to explain? Second, what variables will do that
explaining?
2.1. What dependent variable do we want to explain?
According to Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993), the object of the
RBV is to explain, “sustained competitive advantage.” Indeed, the
title of Barney (1991) is “Firm resources and sustained competitive
advantage,” and the abstract of Peteraf (1993) states “The essence of
this model [the RBV] is that four conditions underlie sustained
competitive advantage, all of which must be met” (p.179). Other
papers in this area reiterate this theme. For example, a recent re-
view of the RBV states that “It [the RBV] aspires to explain the in-
ternal sources of a ﬁrm's sustained competitive advantage”
(Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010, p.350).
We suspect RBV theorists focus on sustained competitive
advantage over ﬁrm performance as the dependent variable
because the original articles assumed a mass of ﬁrms with normal
returns (perhaps with some noise) coupled with a small set of
ﬁrms that have RBV resources and hence, sustained competitive
advantage. Peteraf (1993), for example, explicitly discusses what
would happen if some ﬁrms do not have superior resources that
are in limited supply. In such a situation, “… rents will be dissi-
pated and only normal returns will be earned by efﬁcient (now
homogenous) producers” (p.181). Peteraf (1993) uses rents in the
traditional economic sense as returns above normal returns to
capital.
In this context, where a homogenous mass of ﬁrms has the same
expected returns and a few distinctive ﬁrms have RBV resources,
explaining sustained competitive advantage by RBV resources
owned only by a few ﬁrms makes perfect sense. However, an ex-
amination of performance distributions within industries generally
demonstrates a wide distribution with no “normal ﬁrm” lump.
While RBV theorists claim the RBV explains sustained compet-
itive advantage, very few RBV papers even try to measure it.
Newbert (2007) review of 55 empirical RBV articles ﬁnds that the
dependent variable in 93% of “RBV” articles was performance, 16%
“competitive advantage,” and 2% “sustained competitive advan-
tage” or “sustained performance.” Similarly, Armstrong & Shimizu
(2007) review ﬁnds that only 4 out of 145 RBV empirical articles
even tried to measure sustained competitive advantage. Another 17
of the 145 used three or more year averages of performance to
proxy for sustained competitive advantage. Armstrong and Shimizu
(2007) notes, however, that averages can include below-average
years missing the sustained criterion. In a meta-analysis 125 RBVstudies, Crook et al. (2008) ﬁnds that “22 percent of the utility
available from predicting performance differences across organi-
zations is provided by strategic resources” (p. 1150). Again, the
emphasis is on explaining performance differences, not on sus-
tained competitive advantage.
Sustained competitive advantage (or even temporary competi-
tive advantage) does not equal ﬁrm proﬁtability. A ﬁrm with a
competitive advantage might choose not to increase proﬁts to
prevent entry by other ﬁrms or for other reasons. Alternatively, Coff
(1999) points out that a ﬁrm might have sustained competitive
advantage but not proﬁts if powerful employees or managers
appropriated the beneﬁts of the advantage.
RBV scholars have not clariﬁed what the sustained in sustained
competitive advantage means. Whether sustained is one year or
twenty remains unclear. We suspect the original RBV statements
used “sustained competitive advantage” with a view to “proﬁts in
equilibrium” (the term in Lippman and Rumelt (1982) that many
RBV theoretical articles cite as an important part of the RBV
development). The lack of a clear deﬁnition of sustained adds
another level of ambiguity to the RBV. It also makes the RBV even
more difﬁcult to refute since any evidence of a non-RBV practice
resulting in enduring high performance could be rejected as not
using an appropriate duration for sustained.
Note that our objections have been at the level of elementary
validity e does the measure of the dependent variable used even
approximate the construct. Obviously, you cannot test a theory
that claims to explain sustained competitive advantage without
attempting to measure sustained competitive advantage. Almost
none of the empirical papers claiming a theoretical basis in the
RBV even try to measure sustained competitive advantage. For the
very few papers that attempt to measure sustained competitive
advantage, higher level concerns about validity (e.g., discriminant
and nomological validity) and measurement reliability still
remain.
Substantively, we question whether strategy and operations
management scholars should only focus on explaining the differ-
ences between ﬁrms with sustained competitive advantage and the
mass of other ﬁrms. Wiggins and Rueﬂi (2002) claims that on
average, only 2% of ﬁrms within an industry have sustained high
performance as measured by Tobin's q, with a range of 0%e8%.
Measuring performance by ROA, an average of 5% of ﬁrms have
persistent superior performance, with a range of 1%e13%. While
one can easily debate where one draws the lines and get different
numbers, only a relatively small proportion of ﬁrms have sustained
competitive advantage. Why should scholars focus exclusively on
explaining why the performance of the top 5 or 10% of ﬁrms differs
from the rest while ignoring performance differences among the
remaining ﬁrms? If operations management scholars aspire to
practical relevance, then they probably do not want to ignore per-
formance variation among the immense majority of ﬁrms.
Studies using ﬁrmperformance as the dependent variable do not
necessarily speak to competitive advantage. The many RBV empir-
ical studies that use the entire distribution of performance could
have strong statistical results because they explained performance
variations at thebottomof thedistribution,withnoability toexplain
variation at the top where competitive advantage would lie.
We suspect most strategy and operations management scholars
are as interested or even more interested in explaining variance
within the lower 80% or 90% of ﬁrms in an industry as in explaining
performance differences between the top 10% of ﬁrms in an in-
dustry and the remaining 90% of ﬁrms. Indeed, explaining variation
in performance or ﬁnding techniques that improve performance
may be easier in the lower performing ﬁrms than in the top per-
forming ﬁrms. Pragmatically, half the ﬁrms in an industry would be
better off being average (Bromiley, 2005).
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to study it at levels below the whole business, as most OM schol-
arship does. While we can easily talk about plant productivity and
plant productivity relative to other similar plants, plant produc-
tivity does not connect directly to sustained competitive advantage.
Competitive advantage inherently refers to the amalgam of the
features the ﬁrm brings to the marketplace compared to other
ﬁrms. It is by deﬁnition an overall effect rather than a partial effect.
In some markets, a ﬁrm that excelled consistently in product
development or marketing could have competitive advantage
while being below par in production. In other markets and with
other strategies, production cost might largely determine
competitive advantage. Thus, the idea of competitive advantage
does not translate neatly if one wants to study units below the level
of the business. Indeed, most OM scholarship does not even
examine proﬁtability because proﬁtability does not derive directly
from operational effectiveness.
Hitt et al. (2015) counter some of this reasoning by combining
RBV reasoning with other reasoning such as that by Sirmon et al.
(2007). The original RBV statements assumed that ﬁrms used re-
sources correctly which let theorists tie resources directly to
competitive advantage. Sirmon et al. (2007) claims holding rare,
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources is a necessary but not
sufﬁcient condition for ﬁrms to achieve competitive advantage;
ﬁrms must also manage those resources effectively to achieve
competitive advantage. Note, the “necessary but not sufﬁcient”
statement means that without RBV resources ﬁrms cannot achieve
competitive advantage.
Sirmon et al. (2007) does not address a basic issue related to RBV
as applied to operations management namely, that the RBV relates
to the ﬁrm overall rather than its individual components. Opera-
tions management scholars inherently study part of the ﬁrm.
Competitive advantage simply does not reside at the level of
operations.
In short, sustained competitive advantage as a dependent vari-
able has many problems. How you measure competitive advantage
separately from ﬁrm performance remains unclear. Competitive
advantage also does not translate naturally to levels below that of
overall business performance. Taking sustained competitive
advantage seriously means that we accept the objective of our
research is to explain the differences between an immense mass of
homogenous ﬁrms that do not have such an advantage and the few
that do. We do not think that is what most OM researchers want to
do.
2.2. What explains performance? The problem with inimitable
resources
The second major problem with the RBV comes in the ques-
tion of how we deﬁne resources, and particularly, whether re-
sources can be imitated. While Hitt et al. (2015, p. 6) says that
the RBV says sustained advantage comes from resources that
“must also be difﬁcult to imitate,” Barney (1986, 1991) and
Peteraf (1993) in fact say that resources that give a ﬁrm sus-
tained competitive advantage must be inimitable i.e., only
imperfectly imitable or else entirely impossible to imitate. For
example, Peteraf (1993) states that RBV assets “tend to defy
imitation” (p.183). Barney (1991) identiﬁes imperfectly imitable
resources as stemming from unique historical conditions, causal
ambiguity, or social complexity. Barney (1991) says, “to be a
source of sustained competitive advantage, both the ﬁrms that
possess resources that generate a competitive advantage and the
ﬁrms that do not possess these resources but seek to imitate
them must be faced with the same level of causal ambiguity
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982).” Causal ambiguity means that theﬁrm that possesses the resource must also not understand how it
works. The logic underlying this is that if a manager fully un-
derstood the resource, other ﬁrms could hire the manager and
duplicate the resource.
Resources, as used in the RBV, differ from what we normally
consider resources. Generally, capital cannot be an RBV resource
because ﬁrms can duplicate capital. Likewise, most physical plant
or properties (with the potential exception of unique properties or
equipment) cannot be RBV resources because ﬁrms can duplicate
these. We discuss whether other ﬁrm activities constitute RBV re-
sources below. From here on, when we refer to resources we mean
resources as deﬁned by the RBV.
This emphasis on inimitability arises partially because the the-
orists tended to an economic rationality view that ﬁrms will use all
available beneﬁcial techniques, so only things not generally known
can explain sustained competitive advantage. Indeed, the three
seminal articles make this absolutely clear because they argue that
techniques and practices in the public domain cannot explain ﬁrm
performance under the RBV. Barney (1991), for example, in dis-
cussing why a ﬁrm's formal planning system cannot be a source of
sustained competitive advantage states that “Even if in a particular
industry formal planning is rare, the formal planning process has
been thoroughly described and documented in a wide variety of
public sources (Steiner, 1979). Any ﬁrm interested in engaging in
such formal planning can certainly learn how to do so, and thus
formal planning seems likely to be highly imitable (Barney, 1989).
Thus, apart from substitutability considerations, formal strategic
planning by itself is not likely to be a source of sustained compet-
itive advantage” (p.113).
This line of argument has some implications that the theorists
readily acknowledge. If we take this view (heavily inﬂuenced by
economic rationality assumptions), then a ﬁrm could not start with
what is known and logically develop resources that would provide
sustained competitive advantage because, if one ﬁrm could do it,
other ﬁrms could imitate it. Consequently, the theorists claim that
underneath these advantages must be some random event. Barney
(1986) explicitly states that “… ﬁrms can obtain above normal
returns through luck when they underestimate the true future
value of a strategy” (p. 1238). Having the luck to have a manager
with exceptional ability to anticipate the value of things can also
lead to competitive advantage, although in this case the ﬁrm must
have ways to prevent other ﬁrms from bidding up the individual's
salary.
This use of information ties back to a general problem
acknowledged in the economic literature dating to work by Roy
Radner and others (Arrow, 1986; Radner, 1967, 1968, 1972).
Economic rationality means that everyone has derived all useful
information available in publicly available data. For example,
one knows all the theorems of mathematics once one has the
axioms required to derive the theorems. The same logic un-
derlies the idea of capital market efﬁciency; in an efﬁcient
capital market, one cannot make money using publicly available
information. The RBV logic, just as in the efﬁcient capital market
analyses, does not just say currently known techniques (in
ﬁnance, currently known trading procedures) using public in-
formation will not pay off; it says no such techniques (in ﬁnance,
no possible trading procedures) can exist. In ﬁnance, ﬁnding
such techniques underlies most tests of capital market
efﬁciency.
This economic view has very unpleasant implications for man-
agement and operations management scholarship. If ﬁrms make
optimal choices, then we cannot improve those choices. In other
words, an economic rationality assumption implies there are no
“rules for riches” (Barney, 2001). Indeed, Barney (2001, p.52) claims
that “efforts to develop theories that, when applied, will always
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ﬁrms make optimal operations management decisions, we cannot
develop techniques that would improve such decisions. While ﬁrm
choices may correlate with performance, if ﬁrms make optimal
choices, then preconditions fully explain those choices and ﬁrm
choices simply mediate the relation between preconditions and
performance. Performance differences cannot be explained by
differences in decision quality, which makes the choice
uninteresting.
The RBV's resources not being subject to imitation rules out
trying to understand which ﬁrms adopt which practices. If re-
sources cannot be imitated, then there is no point in studying their
imitation. Consider for example our understanding of organiza-
tional structure. According to Chandler (1962), at the ﬁrst part of
the 20th century, ﬁrms could gain advantage by adopting divisional
organizations. However, as more managers understood the divi-
sional organizational form, the beneﬁts from its adoption may have
declined. Armour and Teece (1978), for example, ﬁnds that early
adopters of the M form beneﬁted while late adopters did not.
Likewise, going back to the formal planning system example cited
earlier from Barney (1991), when many ﬁrms did not practice
strategic planning, scholars found such planning associated with
high performance. De Geus (1988), for example, notes the use of
scenarios in strategic planning allowed Shell to cope better than its
competitors with a drastic drop in oil prices in the spring of 1986.
As more ﬁrms became aware of strategic planning, however, the
association between planning and performance became negligible,
and is currently considered by many scholars to depend on speciﬁc
ﬁrm level factors such as operational ﬂexibility (Rudd et al., 2008).
Understanding which practices ﬁrms use has been a focus of many
OM scholars that is largely incompatible with the RBV.
In the operations area, consider the research on benchmarking
and ﬁrms learning from other ﬁrms. Benchmarking is a practice
explicitly designed to modify practices by imitation. The concept of
benchmarking rests on the assumptions that (i) some ﬁrms have
superior practices in given areas, (ii) other ﬁrms can imitate the
practices of ﬁrms with superior practices, and (iii) such imitation
can improve the adopting ﬁrm's performance. Much of operations
management work on this topic in the 1990s revolved around the
theme of learning from others, with the underlying idea that ﬁrms
can imitate practices related to quality management. Studies
therefore tried to identify the conditions within companies that
supported the adoption of these practices, thereby resulting in
manufacturing excellence (e.g., Flynn et al., 1994). Benchmarking is
thus the antithesis of the RBV; benchmarking emphasizes the
beneﬁts from imitable practices.
Alternatives exist to the economic logic underlying RBV that
make more sense for management studies. At least since Simon
(1949), management scholars have worked with the assumption
of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality simply means we as-
sume people try to achieve their goals, but they do so subject to
what we know about people's ability to process information.
Naturally, actual modeling requires simpliﬁcations from the com-
plete understanding of human decision making. Developing tools
to improve decisions makes perfect sense in a bounded rationality
world, but not in one that assumes ﬁrms make optimal decisions.
For discussion of the differences between bounded and non-1 The “always generate” condition might save this statement. However, we sus-
pect few if any non-tautological things always generate sustained competitive
advantage. There is certainly no evidence that any speciﬁc thing always generates
sustained competitive advantage. In our opinion, the best management scholars
can hope for is to ﬁnd things that have high probabilities of improving
performance.bounded rationality, see Herbert Simon's Nobel Prize Lecture
(1978).
The entire endeavor of operations management scholarship
makes sense in a bounded rationality world but does not make
sense in an economic rationality one. With bounded rationality, we
can ﬁnd tools that will help improve decisions. With bounded ra-
tionality, ﬁrms generally will not use all the potentially beneﬁcial
techniques for a variety of reasons (Bromiley, 2005). If you assume
economic rationality, then ﬁrms already make optimal choices,
which by deﬁnition cannot be improved. Looking for better deci-
sion rules makes no sense under the assumption that ﬁrms make
optimal decisions.
2.3. The problem with valuable resources
The construct of resources has other problems. Let us note
another major one; RBV resources must be valuable. Some ob-
servers criticized the RBV as tautological in that the determination
a ﬁrm has an RBV resource depends on ﬁrm performance (Priem
and Butler, 2001; Bromiley and Fleming, 2002). In response to
these criticisms, Barney (1991, 2001) argued that a resource could
be identiﬁed if it met the conditions of being valuable, rare, inim-
itable, and unsubstitutable. However, this does not solve the
problem. Barney (1991) conditions for the most part rule out the
possibility that one could directly market a resource, that is, buy or
sell the resource independent of the rest of the organization. For
example, Barney (1991) emphasizes that “The requirement that
ﬁrm resources be immobile… is also clear” (p.105). Peteraf (1993)
notes resources are “nontradeable assets which develop and
accumulate within the ﬁrm … Because immobile or imperfectly
mobile resources are nontradeable or less valuable to other users,
they cannot be bid away readily from their employer. They remain
bound to the ﬁrm and available for use over the long run. Thus, they
can be sources of competitive advantage” (p.184).
How would we know something that is not tradeable (i.e., for
which market prices cannot exist) is valuable? For the most part,
we know it is valuable because it leads to desirable organizational
outcomes like performance, but performance is what we want to
explain with the resource. While we have talked about these issues
at the conceptual level, pragmatically think how hard it would be to
demonstrate the ﬁrm actually has an RBV resource, i.e., something
about the ﬁrm is valuable, rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable,
without reference to ﬁrm performance and without being able to
ﬁnd market prices for such resources. Yet, this is a precondition for
something being an RBV resource.
The onus on justifying a measure lies with the scholar who uses
it. If a scholar wants to claim to have an RBV resource, the scholar
would need to demonstrate the thing is valuable, rare, inimitable,
and unsubstitutable. We seldom see such demonstrations.
We also question the idea that unmarketable resources have
value independent of how ﬁrms use them. The impact of almost
anything a ﬁrm does depends heavily on other factors. Unless you
have a market price, the value of a given resource (whether in the
form of a behavior, practice, or physical asset) is not predetermined
or exogenous. Rather it depends on how managers use that
resource and the conditions surrounding that resource in the ﬁrm
and market (Miller, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2007).
The returns to the ﬁrm from using any practice depend on many
other factors. For example, consider a ﬁrm that is exceedingly good
at low cost, long-run assembly line manufacturing. This ability may
positively inﬂuence performance in industries where low cost, long
runs are desirable. However, in an industry that valued short runs,
it would be a negative; job shops might be better. The ability to do
research and development might have positive returns in certain
ﬁelds, but negative returns in ﬁelds with stable, well-known
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marketable, unique resources are valuable suggests the resource
itself has value rather than the resource interacts with other factors
to produce performance beneﬁts. Note, that to justify something as
ameasure of a RBV resource, the researcher must demonstrate such
value independent of ﬁrm performance.
To summarize our discussion above, the deﬁnition of RBV re-
sources faces serious issues of tautology. If we deﬁne resources as
having a positive impact on performance, then we have ruled by
deﬁnition that resources cannot negatively inﬂuence performance,
creating the tautology. If an identical set of resources or practices
can have positive or negative impacts on performance depending
on other factors, then the idea of valuing resources that do not have
a market-determined price is problematic. Indeed, it illustrates the
positive bias of the RBV in that it sees idiosyncratic activities as
associated with positive performance; idiosyncratic practices could
just as likely associate with negative performance. In fact, in some
domains it may be quite likely (Winter and Szulanski, 2001).
Maritan and Brush (2003), for example, examines the imple-
mentation of ﬂowmanufacturing in multiple plants at an industrial
products ﬁrm. The study ﬁnds a wide variance (including unde-
sirable variation) in implementation across plants; this variance
stemmed from across-plant heterogeneity which in turn resulted
from differences in both conventional resource endowments and
managerial choices. If an industry has converged on a set of effec-
tive practices, those that deviate in idiosyncratic ways often will
have lower performance than those who follow the practices. The
fundamental statements of the RBV ignore this possibility.
3. Implications of valuable and inimitable resources for
research
As we note earlier, Barney (1991) states that unique historical
conditions, causal ambiguity, or social complexity generate
imperfectly imitable resources. From an empirical standpoint, this
is problematic. How exactly do you measure something that must
be valuable but not understandable or imitable? In general, RBV
scholars use some conventional measure like R&D spending,
claiming that it actually proxies for some underlying ﬁrm-speciﬁc
non-imitable ﬁrm resource like an ability to innovate (e.g., Sher
and Yang, 2005). However, it does not take much belief in
Occam's razor to see that R&D spending is a much better measure
of R&D resource allocation than it is of some rare, valuable, inimi-
table, not understood, innovation ability. The same is true for
almost all measures of resources in RBV empirical work. It strikes us
as problematic to use a measure that at least in theory can assign
identical values to two ﬁrms while at the same time claiming that
measure indicates something that is rare and inimitable. Indeed,
we had a colleague who truly believed in the RBV and quit doing
research because he could not imagine how you could ever mea-
sure resources.
The immense majority of operations management research
emphasizes empirical studies. To use the RBV, one must be able to
measure resources. While in some cases such measurements may
be feasible, we have little evidence of measures that really meet all
four conditions identiﬁed by Peteraf (1993) or Barney (1991, 2001).
The deﬁnition of RBV resources also means that we cannot
usefully talk about ﬁrms having different levels of a given resource.
If multiple ﬁrms can have different levels of something, then that
something cannot be an RBV resource because it is imitable and not
rare.
In short, if researchers want to take the RBV theorists seriously,
then they must only consider practices that are extremely difﬁcult
or impossible to imitate and must only attempt to explain differ-
ences between normal and sustained competitive advantage. Notethat, as in our discussion of sustained competitive advantage, we
are discussing validity problems; we have not even questioned the
reliability of such measures. If researchers want to use well-
deﬁned, imitable practices to explain performance, the RBV does
not apply.
Belief in the RBV in strategic management has resulted in RBV
advocates claiming various kinds of research are inappropriate.
Scholars (and journal reviewers) who really believe in the RBV
reject the idea (and empirical evidence) that generally observable
and replicable activities explain ﬁrm performance. Of course, the
empirical evidence is absolutely to the contrary; a massive number
studies across strategy, operations management, and in almost
every discipline in the business school demonstrate that the use of
management techniques taught in business schools does associate
positively with performance (see Bromiley and Rau (2014) for ex-
amples). We discuss this evidence and its implications for opera-
tions management scholarship in the next section.
Some have even gone so far as to suggest that strategic man-
agement had no theory that could explain ﬁrm differences below
the level of industry before the RBV or that prior to the RBV strategy
scholars only dealt with industry difference (Levinthal, 1995;
Barney, 2001). However, this is historically incorrect. Throughout
the entire history of empirical scholarship in strategic manage-
ment, and long before the generation of the RBV, most strategy (and
OM) scholars studied inter-ﬁrm differences in behavior and per-
formance often within industries (see, for example, Hoopes et al.
(2003) discussion of competitive heterogeneity). One only need
look at the tables of contents for Strategic Management Journal in
the years before the RBV to see strategy scholars have always
addressed inter-ﬁrm differences (Bromiley, 2005).
Likewise, operations management scholars have dealt with
inter-ﬁrm or inter-plant differences in operations management
practices long before the development of the RBV (see, for example,
Skinner (1969)). Theoretically, these scholars rested their work on
well-developed theories including the behavioral theory of the ﬁrm
(Cyert and March, 1963), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling,
1976), and transactions cost economics (Williamson, 1989).
Mosakowski (1998) points out that the RBV is particularly
problematic when you consider prescription. The RBV rules out the
possibility that publicly known practices could explain variance in
performance. However, any practice explained in the open litera-
ture is by deﬁnition publicly known; if you explain how to do
something in a journal, it cannot be an RBV resource. The only
advice that the RBV might provide would be about helping ﬁrms
exploit their resources once they have the original resource, but
this is not very helpful since a) the RBV assumes everyone uses such
advice appropriately once it appears in the public domain and b) it
does not tell ﬁrms how to get the resource initially.
Mosakowski (1998) critique is particularly relevant to opera-
tions management. The mission statement of the Journal of Oper-
ations Management says, “The mission of Journal of Operations
Management is to publish original, high quality, operations man-
agement empirical research that will have a signiﬁcant impact on
OM theory and practice. Regular articles accepted for publication in
JOMmust have clear implications for operationsmanagers based on
one or more of a variety of rigorous researchmethodologies.” Given
the assumption that RBV resources must be nearly or completely
inimitable, they generally do not meet this journal's call for prac-
tical implications.
So far, we have offered a variety of concerns about the RBV in
general and the application of the RBV to operations management.
We questionwhether the RBV really makes interesting and testable
predictions. We note that, to be true to the RBV, researchers must
(1) attempt to explain the difference betweenmost ﬁrms and those
with sustained competitive advantage, and (2) use as an
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evidence it is rare, valuable (although not sold in markets) and
difﬁcult or impossible to imitate. If researchers do not want to
deﬁne their work this way, they have two basic choices.
First, like many studies, researchers can take a somewhat
ambiguous interpretation of the RBV in place of what the theorists
originally claimed. Astley (1985, 501) notes that, “The maintenance
of linguistic ambiguity enhances a theory's conceptual appeal by
widening its potential applicability.” The RBV's ambiguity, in fact,
may account for a great deal of its popularity. While ambiguity has
beneﬁts, one's preference for ambiguous theorizing clearly de-
pends on one's intellectual training and other proclivities. We
would generally favor clear theories that we can compare theo-
retically and, potentially, reject empirically. An emphasis on
ambiguous theories results in a quagmire of apparent theories with
no way to choose among them.
Alternatively, researchers can turn to the practice based view
(Bromiley and Rau, 2014). We discuss this in the next section.
4. The practice based view
Even a casual glance at large-sample OM studies shows that
many OM scholars want to study how broadly available practices
that are in noway inimitable or rare inﬂuence performance: just-in-
time principles, kanban, lot size reduction, employee involvement,
statistical process control, supply chain collaboration, et cetera.
These practices have proven valuable in numerous empirical
studies, but are incompatible with the RBV. The RBV would predict
that these practices do not lead to sustained competitive advantage
since every ﬁrm can implement them. In this section, we present an
alternative view that allows for variation in adoption of beneﬁcial
practices, and for ties between such adoption andﬁrmperformance.
Bromiley and Rau's (2014) practice based view (PBV) offers OM
researchers an approach compatible with using imitable practices
to explain the entire range of performance. The PBV says that, due
to bounded rationality, ﬁrms often do not know of and/or do not
use all the techniques that might beneﬁt them. Consequently, we
may explain performance partially by “imitable activities or prac-
tices, often in the public domain, amenable to transfer across ﬁrms”
(Bromiley and Rau, 2014, p.1249) where practices are a deﬁned
activity or set or activities that a variety of ﬁrms might execute
(Bromiley and Rau, 2014).
Paralleling our discussion of the RBV, we now discuss two major
components of the PBV: the dependent variable the PBV wants to
explain and the variables that will do that explaining.
4.1. The practice based view: what dependent variable do we want
to explain?
The PBV rejects the idea that all we want to do is explain sus-
tained competitive advantage. In its place, we want to explain
performance. While strategy scholars generally look at ﬁrm-level
performance, the argument applies equally to plant or business
unit performance. This does not eliminate all the difﬁculties in
measuring performance, but it does eliminate the inherent illogic of
using annual ﬁnancial or operational performance to measure
sustained competitive advantage.
Given an interest in the entire distribution of ﬁrm performance,
the PBV also raises the possibility that what generates or explains
variation in ﬁrm performance varies across levels of ﬁrm perfor-
mance. What differentiates a poor from a good high school
basketball player has very little to do with what differentiates a
poor from a good professional basketball player. In operations
terms, what explains variation in performance in very badly run
factories probably differs from what explains variation inperformance in well-run factories. For example, in study of textile
plants in India, Bloom et al. (2011) found that simple things like
cleaning out the garbage on the shop ﬂoor, painting lines indicating
where equipment should rest, having an inventory of materials,
and tracking machine breakdowns signiﬁcantly raised plant per-
formance. Similar ﬁndings exist in operations management (c.f.,
Bayo-Moriones et al. (2010) on cleanliness and plant operating
performance, and Flynn et al. (1994) that includes neatness in a
discussion of quality management principles). Obviously, this only
works in an environment where all ﬁrms do not do these things.
Different imitable factors explain variation in performance in
populations where everyone already does these basic things.
4.2. What explains performance? The effect of publicly available
practices
Practices can be as simple as cleaning out the garbage or as
complex as the most advanced optimization procedure and can
have positive or negative inﬂuences on performance. Most ﬁrms
may use some practices but there remain practices that only part of
the population of ﬁrms uses. Consequently, publicly available
practices can explain variations in ﬁrm performance. The PBV
explicitly rejects the idea that ﬁrms use all techniques that could
beneﬁt them. This aligns directly with our understanding of the
primary thrust of OM scholarship: understanding what organiza-
tions use what deﬁnable practices and how such use inﬂuences
performance.
Assuming ﬁrms do not use all the techniques that would beneﬁt
them agrees with massive empirical evidence that shows well-
deﬁned techniques, whether they are operations management
tools, corporate compensation practices, HR practices, or any of a
dozen other things that we teach in the business school, explain
part of the variance in ﬁrm performance. Let us consider some of
this evidence.
Bloom and colleagues ﬁnd the use of several common man-
agement practices (e.g., having key performance indicators for
production, setting goals, having clear performance measures,
rewarding high performers, and removing poor performers) asso-
ciate signiﬁcantly with ﬁrm performance; ﬁrms that apply these
practices do better than ﬁrms that do not (Bloom et al., 2007;
Bloom et al., 2012; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006). These studies
examine thousands of ﬁrms in a variety of industries and across
many countries. The experimental study by Bloom et al. (2011) that
we referred to earlier demonstrates this point even more
convincingly. The study assigned ﬁrms in a sample of Indian textile
plants randomly to treatment and non-treatment groups, where
both groups received some free consulting but the treatment group
received advice on (and was encouraged to follow) modern man-
agement practices such as clean production ﬂoors, regular machine
maintenance, recording reasons for machine breakdowns, keeping
an accurate inventory, and so on. Firms in the treatment group
increased their average productivity by 11% more than ﬁrms in the
control group.
Studies in other areas such as human resource management,
strategic management, and knowledge management ﬁnd similar
results (Collins and Clark, 2003; Combs et al., 2006; Huselid, 1995;
Ichniowski et al., 1997; Marques and Simon, 2006; Nohria et al.,
2003). For example, in a meta-analytic study of 92 studies exam-
ining high performance work practices, Combs et al. (2006) ﬁnds
that ﬁrms that use common high performance work practices such
as incentive compensation, performance appraisal, internal pro-
motion policies, and procedures for airing grievances perform
better than companies that do not.
In the operations management ﬁeld, studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms that
use well known practices such as those related to total quality
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ﬁrms that do not use these practices (Kaynak, 2003; Nair, 2006;
Vonderembse and Tracey, 1999). For example, in a study of 382
U.S. ﬁrms from various industries, Kaynak (2003) ﬁnds that estab-
lished total quality management practices such as supplier quality
management, product/service design, and process management
directly inﬂuenced operating performance while management
leadership, training, employee relations, and quality data and
reporting inﬂuenced operating performance through the practices
of supplier quality management, product/service design, and pro-
cess management. Vonderembse and Tracey (1999) ﬁnds that ﬁrms
that implement explicit supplier selection criteria and involve
suppliers perform better than ﬁrms that do not use these practices.
This list could include the majority of OM empirical research.
Of course, the evidence does not show that all ﬁrms would
beneﬁt from adopting any speciﬁc practice. How much a given
practice would beneﬁt a given ﬁrm is a non-trivial issue and likely
varies with ﬁrm and industry, although there are probably practices
that all ﬁrms in an industry would beneﬁt from employing. Lean
manufacturing practices, for example, while certainly of value, may
not be appropriate for all manufacturing ﬁrms. Likewise, the liter-
ature on best practices ﬁnds that, even within a single industry,
ﬁrms cannot and should not attempt to implement exactly the
same set of practices (Howard et al., 2007; Robertson et al., 1996).
While there is a potential for over-interpretation and other po-
tential design issues in the evidence we have just presented, all of
the practices associated with high performance in the majority of
ﬁrms studied are imitable, and neither surprising nor too techni-
cally complex for many ﬁrms to use.
The PBV also focuses attention on understanding which ﬁrms
use which practices, a study largely ruled out by the RBV's inimit-
ability assumption. A full explanation of OM phenomena would
include at least an explanation of ﬁrm use of speciﬁc techniques
along with the impact of such techniques on performance.
5. Implications of the practice based view for operations
management research
Summarizing our arguments above, the PBV differs from the
RBV in three primary ways. First, our primary outcome or depen-
dent variable of interest should be performance, not sustained
competitive advantage. Speciﬁcally, researchers should be inter-
ested in explaining differences in performance among all the ﬁrms
in an industry, and not just in the differences between the top 10%
or so and the remaining ﬁrms. In the OM context, this equates to
explaining variation in performance at whatever level a particular
study chooses. Second, the PBV holds that imitable resources or
practices may account for differences in performance among ﬁrms;
additionally, the same factors may not explain performance dif-
ferences across the entire range of performance variation in an
industry. Third, the explanation of ﬁrm use of practices is central to
the PBV but nonsensical in the RBV.
PBV research involves two primary classes of dependent vari-
ables. First, we have dependent variables associated with the
adoption or utilization of speciﬁc practices. The details of these
variables depend on the speciﬁc practices considered in any study.
Second, we have performance outcomes instead of the competitive
advantage of the RBV. Here too, the PBV offers some ﬂexibility. The
PBV allows for a wide variety of intermediate and ﬁnal dependent
variables, but also would encourage us to look at the connections
between the two. By intermediate, wemean things like defect rates
or cost per unit. By ﬁnal, we mean overall proﬁtability. Naturally,
one might legitimately study what determines defect rates but one
might also want to show the defect rates associate negatively with
unit ﬁnancial performance.The PBV highlights several kinds of research questions. Let us
beginwith those that relate to the ﬁrst class of dependent variables
namely, the adoption or utilization of speciﬁc practices.
5.1. Research questions associated with the adoption or utilization
of speciﬁc practices
Since the PBV assumes that ﬁrms do not use every beneﬁcial
technique, what determines which ﬁrms use which practices? The
RBV assumes a simple functionalist explanation that predicts that
all ﬁrms that could beneﬁt from a practice will use it. Potential
beneﬁts from adoption inﬂuence adoption under the PBV as well,
but the PBV entertains other explanations for which some empir-
ical evidence exists.
For example, while the PBV allows that ﬁrms may adopt prac-
tices that could increase proﬁts more quickly than practices with
less proﬁt beneﬁt, this is not a given in the PBV. Instead, the PBV ties
back to various established literature on the diffusion of innovation,
social desirability and legitimacy, ﬁrm networks, and the behavioral
theory of the ﬁrm to suggest a variety of factors that will inﬂuence
adoption beyond actual beneﬁts of the practice. Let us brieﬂy note
some of the possible explanations.
One explanation for adoption would derive from organizational
practices that systematically change other organizational practices.
Some organizations have routines that search for improvements in
existing practices or for better practices in certain deﬁned areas
even when performance is adequate. Such routines include new
product development, internal consulting, TQM, Kaizen, six sigma,
benchmarking, etc. Generally, however, such routines only search
within speciﬁc domains. Thus, new product development routines
will probably not ﬁnd practices that improve HR and vice versa.
Alternatively, the behavioral theory of the ﬁrm (BTOF, Cyert &
March, 1963) addresses when ﬁrms are most likely to seek prac-
tices that will improve performance. The BTOF predicts ﬁrms will
seek new practices when their performance falls below targets. A
substantial literature in management based on the behavioral
theory of the ﬁrm ﬁnds low performance relative to targets or as-
pirations drives a variety of change activities from risk-taking to
mergers.
The BTOF also notes that the search for better practices depends
on organizational factors. Managers will search in areas seen as
“near” to the area in which the problem appeared. Search will also
depend on managerial beliefs. Managers will search in areas they
believe are likely to contain solutions that can raise performance
above aspirations (March and Simon, 1958). Thus, search depends
on managers' prior knowledge. Many ﬁrms may not look for
(let alone ﬁnd) particular kinds of management practices because
they simply have never thought about the possibility of improving
performance in an area by applying such practices. This explains
the non-adoption of innovations like TQM and 6-Sigma in the US
before their popularization in the US. Books existed detailing the
processes, but US managers simply did not think to look for them.
Changes in ownership or management may ameliorate this prob-
lem as new managers and owners bring their knowledge of, and
experiences with, practices used in their previous ﬁrms (Barden,
2012).
Social factors (such as social desirability, legitimacy, and ﬁrm or
managerial networks) also may inﬂuence the search for and
adoption of new practices. Firm networks and the use of practices
by local ﬁrms may inﬂuence managers' beliefs about practices.
Local ﬁrms using the practice increases the likelihood that a ﬁrm's
managers hear of the practice and can ﬁnd individuals knowl-
edgeable about the practice (Connelly et al., 2011; Corrocher and
Fontana, 2008; Xu et al., 2012). Managers may choose to mimic
ﬁrms seen as having high legitimacy. Managersmay also respond to
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plants in ﬁve countries and across three industries, Ketokivi and
Schroeder (2004) ﬁnds that plants may adopt innovative
manufacturing practices (e.g., JIT, cross-training of employees) not
just because of strategic or structural contingency related reasons,
but because of institutional isomorphism reasons. That is, plants
may sometimes adopt new practices simply because their peers
have done so.
Even if a ﬁrm ﬁnds a commonly used practice, a variety of other
factors may inﬂuence adoption. Implicitly or explicitly, managers
balance the expected costs of adoption against its expected bene-
ﬁts. These costs and beneﬁts may include the costs and beneﬁts to
the managers themselves, the costs and beneﬁts to their units, and
the costs and beneﬁts from the corporate perspective. Often, the
estimates of costs and beneﬁts depend on managerial opinions
with only modest empirical support; estimating the beneﬁts from
new practices is often difﬁcult. Consequently, managers may decide
that the expected costs of adopting a new management practice
outweigh the practice's beneﬁts (Smith et al., 2010). Such decisions
will include some errors of both commission (over-estimating the
beneﬁts resulting in adoption of practices that do not have appro-
priate beneﬁts) and omission (under-estimating the beneﬁts
resulting in rejection of practices that would have had appropriate
beneﬁts). Both the decision to explore a practice and the subse-
quent decision to implement will depend onmanagement's ex ante
estimation of the costs and beneﬁts of the practice. Ungan (2005),
for example, ﬁnds that companies may identify better
manufacturing practices that produced superior results elsewhere
but not adopt them if adoption requires an unacceptable amount of
change in the adopting organization. Even when approving adop-
tion, managers in the adopting organization may provide inade-
quate managerial support for implementing some practices.
The characteristics of the practice and the interaction of those
characteristics with those of the organization should also inﬂuence
adoption. Firm age, size, and slack should inﬂuence adoption
although the evidence on the effects of these factors is mixed.
Nakamura and Ohashi (2012), for example, ﬁnd that large organi-
zations adopt new practices earlier, but also retain the old tech-
nology longer. At the same time, smaller, younger organizations
may be more ﬂexible, and therefore, more likely to adopt in-
novations (Pierce and Delbecq, 1977).
Firms are more likely to adopt practices that have obvious
payoffs over those with more diffuse returns e improving truck
routing or inventory management has clearer beneﬁts than
improving a planning or personnel evaluation system. Firms are
more likely to adopt practices that require less change and conse-
quently less disruption of the organization e in other words,
practices that are compatible with the existing practices of the ﬁrm.
The literature on managerial biases, judgment, and decision mak-
ing should shed more light on these issues.
In short, while the RBV rules out understanding adoption (since
RBV resources are inimitable), the PBV leaves the entire domain of
explaining which ﬁrms use which practices open. Indeed, self-
selection issues imply that understanding the impact of a practice
on performance requires appropriate controls for which ﬁrms
choose to use the practice.
5.2. Research questions associated with the performance outcomes
of speciﬁc practices
The second major thrust of the PBV e explaining the impact of
practices on performance e is likewise consistent with a wide va-
riety of explanatory factors. While we might expect a main effect
from the use of a given practice, we should also expect the impact of
a given practice on performance depends on both moderating andmediating variables. How much a practice beneﬁts a given com-
pany will depend signiﬁcantly on the other practices operating in
the company. A practice might inﬂuence performance directly or
indirectly. For example, a practice that increased manufacturing
ﬂexibility might improve performance by the ﬂexibility increasing
sales, lowering costs, or increasing quality.
Some practices will inﬂuence performance negatively or not at
all. For example, certain practices represent fads; they become
widely accepted without their having a demonstrable positive in-
ﬂuence on performance.Whereas the RBV deﬁnes resources strictly
as valuable, i.e. positive, the PBV allows for the possibility that
practices may have positive, negative, or neutral impacts on per-
formance both directly and indirectly and may have different im-
pacts in different circumstances. Understanding the circumstances
under which a given activity beneﬁts or damages the company is
essential to understanding both the practice and prescription (see,
for instance, the discussion of ﬁt in Hult et al., 2005).
In all of this, organizational history and context will matter not
only by inﬂuencing the practices the ﬁrm considers using but also
by inﬂuencing how the new practices inﬂuence ﬁrm performance.
Consequently, while in some cases wewill be interested in themain
effect of the practices' inﬂuence on performance, more commonly
wewill want to understand under what conditions a ﬁrm's practice
has what impacts on performance.
Our ability to explain variation in performance may also differ
across performance levels just as our ability to provide advice to
improve operations differs. Factors that differentiate performance
among badly run ﬁrms may be standard practice in well run ones.
We may it easier to explain differences among poorly run opera-
tions than among well run ones. Indeed, a parallel exists between
our ability to explain variation in performance and our ability to
provide advice that would improve operations. Prescription de-
pends on a belief that a practice applied in a given situation posi-
tively inﬂuences performance. Both what explains performance
variation and our ability to offer useful prescription may differ
dramatically across performance levels.
Whereas the RBV assumes ﬁrms adopt all useful transferable
practices, the PBV recognizes that practices differ radically in how
easy they are to transfer. That is, the PBV views ease of adoption as a
continuum. At one end, we have very easily adopted practices like
buying more fuel-efﬁcient trucks. At the other end of the contin-
uum, the PBV converges with the RBV in recognizing that some
practices or resources are extremely hard or even impossible to
transfer or imitate (e.g., creating a 3 M innovative culture). The
easily adopted practices tend to be simple, well-deﬁned, modular
practices (e.g., using software to efﬁciently route trucks). Simple
does not mean that the internal operation of the practice is simple
but rather that the user has a relatively simple interface. Well-
deﬁned means the practice has clear implications for behavior.
Modular implies that the practice is to some extent decomposable
(Simon, 1969); it does not require complex interactions with many
portions of the organization. Consequently, researchers may want
to characterize practices along a variety of dimensions and under-
stand how those dimensions inﬂuence both adoption and the in-
ﬂuence of adoption on subsequent performance.
Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the differences between
the RBV and the PBV.
6. Using the PBV to explain RBV based OM research: two
examples
We have made a number of claims about RBV research based on
scholarship in the strategic management domain. However, a
number of OM papers also use the RBV. We look at two exemplars
below and discuss how the PBV might be a more useful perspective
Table 1
Key differences between the RBV and the PBV.
RBV PBV
Dependent variable Sustained competitive advantage Adoption or utilization of speciﬁc practices
Intermediate or ﬁnal performance outcomes at the ﬁrm,
business unit, plant, or other levels
Explanatory variables Rare, valuable, hard to imitate, and hard to substitute resources Practices about which knowledge is publicly available
Key question What explains sustained competitive advantage? That is,
why do the top ﬁrms in an industry outperform the rest?
What explains differences in performance (or related
outcomes) among ﬁrms, business units, or plants, across
the entire range of performance?
Underlying assumptions Markets are at equilibrium. The great mass of ﬁrms within
an industry has normal economic returns (i.e., similar performance),
while a very few show superior (above normal) performance.
All information that is publicly available will be used by the ﬁrm.
Hence, sustained competitive advantage can only derive from
resources that are rare, valuable, hard to imitate, and not substitutable.
Firms show a wide variation in performance within an
industry.
All ﬁrms do not use all practices that could beneﬁt them.
Consequently, the use of practices can explain performance
variation.
The beneﬁts of a practice may vary across ﬁrms and may
depend on a variety of moderators. For example, practices
that explain performance differences among low and
medium performing ﬁrms may not explain performance
differences among medium and high performing ﬁrms.
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these studies.
Before discussing these studies, let us observe that great many
studies adopt similar strategies and present similar problems. Like
many studies that refer to the RBV, researchers often reinterpret the
RBV to be much more reasonable than the RBV's actual speciﬁca-
tion. Our objective here is not to criticize these studies, but to
illustrate how our concerns noted above played out in actual
scholarship.
Sarkis et al. (2010) in the Journal of Operations Management
claims to use the RBV. This study examines whether environmental
training efforts mediate the inﬂuence of stakeholder pressures on
the adoption of environmental practices. Using a sample of 157
Spanish automotive companies, this study ﬁnds that environmental
training in eco-design, life cycle assessment, recycling/reusing, and
waste elimination mediates the relations between stakeholder
pressures and the adoption of three major groups of environmental
practices including eco-design, source reduction, and environ-
mental management systems. The study claims these results
illustrate the complementarity of the stakeholder and RBV theo-
retical frameworks, where training helps to build an RBV resource
namely, knowledge resources. Let us now illustrate the concerns
noted above as reﬂected in this paper.
Again, let us note that we are not addressing the importance or
contribution of the Sarkis et al. (2010) study. Our point is that the
RBV does not advance the paper's contribution; the RBV is unnec-
essary, indeed misleading.
Consistent with our discussion of the dependent variable, Sarkis
et al. (2010) explains adoption of environmental practices, not the
RBV's competitive advantage. The connection between the adop-
tion of environmental practices and sustained competitive advan-
tage remains undemonstrated. Thus, the study does not attempt to
explain the dependent variable the RBV claims to explain.
Also consistent with our discussion of problems in measuring
resources, we note that this study talks about RBV resources, but
does not attempt to measure them directly. Instead, the study looks
at how the adoption of training moderates the inﬂuence of stake-
holder pressures on environmental practices. The phrasing itself
(adoption of X) raises questions whether that X is sufﬁciently
difﬁcult to imitate to meet the RBV's inimitability condition, and X
certainly cannot meet it if several ﬁrms adopted that something.
Training itself is unlikely to be an RBV resource, not being rare and
generally not hard to imitate. While an internal training program
that had much better results than other forms of training might be
an RBV resource, training using standard materials or externalcourses cannot be considered an RBV resource. In the Sarkis et al.
(2010), two ﬁrms in an industry might do almost precisely the
same training; for all we know, two ﬁrms may have sent employees
to exactly the same training program. The topics of training (eco-
design, life-cycle assessment, recycling, and disposal of production
waste) touch on well-known methodologies.
One might argue that even though ﬁrms used similar training,
they learned different amounts or used the training differently.
However, for the RBV explanation to make sense, what has to
matter is the idiosyncratic differences in learning (i.e., how ﬁrm
learning deviated from what is normally learnt in a program), not
the imitable main effect from the training.
Note also, if the intent of Sarkis et al. (2010, 163) is to assess
“whether or not training should be integrated in order to help with
the adoption of particular environmental practices,” the paper
clearly assumes that training is imitable; otherwise there would be
no point in assessing whether ﬁrms should do it.
Consider now how the PBV might ﬁt this study better. The
dependent variable is a variant of performance and the analysis
considers the entire range of outcomes, ﬁtting well with the PBV.
The primary explanatory factors, forms of training, are practices
that can be transferred across ﬁrms.
Consistent with the PBV but inconsistent with the RBV, Sarkis
et al. (2010) explicitly models the determinants of training. As
Sarkis et al. (2010) notes, that this still leaves open a variety of
complexities; both who undertakes the practice (training) and the
effect of that practice on the outcomes can depend on a variety of
other factors. While Sarkis et al. (2010) only use stakeholder pres-
sures to explain training, subsequent research under the PBV could
greatly expand the potential explanations of training.
To summarize, Sarkis et al. (2010) does not use the RBV's
dependent variable and explains outcomes with something that
cannot be an RBV resource - training which is generally imitable.
We question the utility of the RBV to this analysis.
Hult et al. (2005) applywhat is claimed to be an RBV approach to
the beneﬁts of speciﬁc resources in supply chain management. This
paper also reﬂects the concerns we have with RBV studies.
First, the paper does not try to measure sustained competitive
advantage. The ﬁrm uses survey measures of supply chain speed,
quality, cost, and ﬂexibility as measures of performance.
Second, the explanations associating variables with outcomes
derive from other theories, not the RBV. In this case, the study uses
conﬁguration theories in strategy about ideal types of knowledge
elements (e.g., tacitness, accessibility, quality, and so on) for speciﬁc
kinds of strategic proﬁles based on Miles and Snow (1978).
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measure what are claimed to be RBV resources measure RBV re-
sources. For example, learning capacity, one dimension that might
make imitation difﬁcult, is measured the following survey items:
“the number of logistics individuals learning new skills is greater
than last year,” “the resources spent on learning have resulted in
increased logistics productivity,” and “our learning activities have
resulted in better logistics performance than last year.” For these to
be legitimate measures of RBV resources, the researcher must
demonstrate that they are not readily imitated. Both the number of
people learning new skills and resources spent on training are
clearly imitable.
The second and third question, that resources spent on learning
or learning activities have resulted in better logistics, could possibly
be an RBV resource but only if what matteredwas not the resources
spent but rather some idiosyncratic difference in learning. How-
ever, it is not clear that the questions really measure such an
idiosyncratic difference in learning. Note also the danger here of
tautology in the resourcemeasure; resources spent on training only
count if they improve logistics performance so the measure de-
pends on performance in a study explaining supply chain perfor-
mance. This problem also appears in other questions in the study.
For example, one of the questions used to measure learning ca-
pacity is “Our learning activities have resulted in better logistics
performance than last year.” Here, the authors deﬁne the measure
the resource in terms of its impact on performance and then use it
to explain performance; a clear illustration of the tautological is-
sues we discussed earlier. These are not simply design issues in one
study; rather they reﬂect underlying problems in the resource
construct. We do not know how a ﬁrm could know the training has
value other than it resulted in desirable outcomes, but the study
wants to use valuable training to explain such outcomes.
Again, the PBV's emphasis on performance rather than sus-
tained competitive advantage and on imitable practices ﬁt this
study better than the RBV. Logistic productivity is a one form of
performance. Training employees is a transferable practice.
Emphasizing the training or learning practices rather than having a
value requirement would help the research avoid issues of
tautology.
We are not saying that these are not important and interesting
studies. Likemany sensible scholars, the authors have reinterpreted
the RBV to make it more reasonable than the original statements
make it. We argue that authors would beneﬁt from using a view
that did not require such reinterpretation.
While we have talked about two studies, the immense majority
of studies citing the RBV follow this pattern. Only very rarely do
studies actually try to explain sustained competitive advantage.
Almost always, the actual mechanisms explaining the outcomes
derive from a non-RBV source. Only rarely if ever do studies offer
measures of resources that appear valid by meeting the criteria for
an RBV resource while avoiding tautology. Most studies attempt to
explain performance across the entire distribution and most use
imitable practices. Instead of shoe-horning these studies into the
RBV, they would much more naturally ﬁt the PBV.
7. Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to explain why the RBV may
not be an appropriate perspective for OM scholarship. Let us
summarize the issues.
To use the RBV, scholars must use RBV resources e valuable and
inimitable factors that other ﬁrms cannot imitate or imitate with
great difﬁculty e to explain sustained competitive advantage i.e.,
performance above “normal” economic rents in an industry. The
analysis assumes ﬁrms use available information and resourcesappropriately. These create signiﬁcant problems. We discussed two
in particular.
The ﬁrst relates to the dependent variable of interest. Apart from
the problems associated with measuring sustained competitive
advantage, using competitive advantage as a dependent variable
implies that scholars should focus on explaining the difference in
performance between the top 10% or so of ﬁrms and all the other
ﬁrms in an industry, ignoring performance variations within the
great mass of ﬁrms in an industry. In addition, competitive
advantage exists at the level of the ﬁrm and does not directly
translate into the normal level of operations management research.
Furthermore, efforts to explain adoption of valuable practices make
little sense in the RBV that assumes such adoption is extremely
difﬁcult or impossible.
The second relates to the explanatory variables. Measuring
valuable resources or factors ﬁrms cannot imitate poses serious
problems both in demonstrating value independent of the factor's
impact on performance (i.e., avoiding tautology) and in measuring
things that cannot be imitated. Under the RBV, prescription is
problematic; you can only prescribe things that the ﬁrms cannot
use unless they already have speciﬁc RBV resources. Studying ﬁrm
use of replicable practices is the antithesis of the RBV.
We presented the PBV as an alternative to the RBV. In the PBV,
scholars can use publicly available practices that ﬁrms can imitate
to explain performance. Practices vary in their ease of adoption or
imitation. The beneﬁts from unique or idiosyncratic abilities appear
as the extreme end of a continuum of ease of imitation. Depending
on various factors, PBV practices could have positive, negative or no
inﬂuence on performance.
The PBV eliminates some of the problems associated with the
RBV e using sustained competitive advantage as the dependent
variable, and using valuable, non-imitable resources as explanatory
variables. In addition, the PBV's emphasis on practices and the in-
teractions of these practices with other ﬁrm level factors makes it
particularly well suited for operations research. In some ways, OM
scholars adopting the PBV may be like Moliere's gentleman who
found he had been speaking prose his entire life.
However, the disadvantage of the PBV is that, like the RBV, it is
an umbrella concept under which one uses other theories to pro-
vide the primary mechanisms that explain why particular organi-
zational characteristics have speciﬁc inﬂuences on competitive
advantage or performance. If researchers feel the need for such an
umbrella concept, they should seriously consider the PBV.
Our intent in this paper is not to tell OM researchers what to do,
but to discuss the research implications of using the RBV. Given the
serious research implications of the RBV, what operations man-
agement researchers need to decide is whether to continue using
the RBV with all of its underlying assumptions or, following the
Occam's razor principle, use a simpler perspective like the PBV.
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